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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
Cr:METllRIES-CIVII. LL\BII.ITIES-TORTS.-Plaintiff sued defendant corpora-
tion for malicious prosecution by its sexton and secretary. Deiendant was 
organized for cemetery purposes, not for profit, and without capital stock. 
The state general code provided that such an association might acquire and 
hold not exceeding one hundred acres of land, apd also take any gift or de-
vise, or the income thereof, in trust, "all of which shall be exempt from exe-
cution." Held, one justice dissenting, under the maxim "e~pressio uniu~ 
e~clusio alterfos" the statute expressly excluded other property from execu-
tion. Hence defendant, though a charitable organization, was liable in a tort 
action. Cantoti Cemetery Association v. Slayman (Ohio, 1918), 121 N. E. 819. 
One line of cases holds that there is no tort liability whatsoever of a char-
itable organization, whether the person injured be a beneficiary, an employe, 
or a third person. Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254 The basis 
of this is that the corporation is merely trustee of a fund for the public bene-
.fit, that since it may not divert the fund by direct acts, it should not be al-
lowed to do so by indirect. Fordyce v. Library Ass'ti., 79 Ark. 550. These 
courts allow only the action against the tortfeasor himself. Perry v. House 
of Refuge, 63 Md. 20. That the wrongdoer may often be penniless is the 
misfortune of the injured party, since "the law does not undertake to pro-
vide a solvent defendant for every wrong done." Vermillion v. T¥oman's 
College, 104 S. C. 197. In distinct conflict is the view taken in Glavin v. 
Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I. 4n, where the plaintiff recovered against a 
charitable institution for unskilful treatment. Subsequent to this decision, 
the Rhode Island legislature created an exemption for hospitals sustained 
by charity. Gen. Laws of R. I., Cap. 213, Sec. 3"8. See Parks v. Nortliweslet'_n 
U11iv., 218 Ill . .;i8r. Partial exemption obtains in other courts, which hold 
that the corporation is liable for the torts of its servants only where it has 
failed to use due care in hiring them. The basis of this view may be that the 
foundation of the! respondeat superior doctrine is that the servant works for 
the master's benefit, and that it cannot be applied where the servant works 
instead for the benefit of the public. H eams v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 
98. There is still another line of cases : that the charitable organization is 
liable to employees and third persons, but not to beneficiaries, on the grounds 
that one who avails himself of the charity assumes the risks incident thereto. 
Dowues v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555. However correct the decision 
of the principal case may be as a rule of abstract justice, it is hardly logical 
from the course of reasoning laid down by the court. That the legislature 
permitted some of defendant's property to be taken on exec11tion may have 
been no more than a means of satisfying judgments in contract actions. The 
right to sue a charitable organization in contract is well settled. Armstrong 
v. Wesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81. A situation similar to that in the principal 
case arose in Ab~·ton v. Waldon Academy, n8 Tenn. 24 There the charter 
of the defendant corporation provided that it might sue and be sued. The 
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court denied recovery in tort, on the grounds that there was abundant scope 
for the operation of the clause in the charter without interfering with the 
principle that a charitable organization could not be sued in tort. 
CoM:r.10N CARRitRs-APPLICATION oF HouRs oF S:i;Rv1c:i; ACT To EMl'LOYEts 
OF TERMINAL Co.-Does the Hours of Service Act apply to a Terminal Com-
pany, operating a union freight station under contracts with ten railroads and 
several steamship companies; owning freight sheds and· yards and connect-
ing tracks, also tugs and car floats, but no cars; leasing two switching en-
gines and employing crews, but carrying no passengers, and receiving goods 
only as agent of the railroads and steamship lines? Held, that such a com-
pany was a common carrier within the meaning of the Act, thus reversing 
239 Fed. 287. United States v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, (U. S. 
Supreme Court, March 24, 1919). 
The court below held that the switching crews of defendant were clearly 
within the object of the Hours of Service Act, but as that act was limited 
to "common carriers" the point was too plain to need elaboration that it did 
not apply to defendant. The Supreme Court finds it too plain to call for 
much elaboration, that this unanimous conclusion of the Circuit Court of 
Appeals, First Circuit, is wrong. It does not depend on any nice distinctions 
-0f definite or corporate power, or of agency, but "whether Congress, in de-
claring the Hours of Service Act applicable to any common carrier or car-
riers, their officers, agents and employees, engaged in the transportation of 
.passengers or property by railroad, made its prohibitions applicable to" de-
fendant. The decision accords with the general principle that the public is 
not concerned with the agencies employed by a carrier to perform its duties, 
they are all impressed with the public nature of the carrier, and as to such 
public duties, the liability is joint and several. No duty or liability should 
be escaped by dividing the service with other agencies. In addition to the 
cases cited in the opinion, see such cases as, Christenson v. Americmi E:r· 
press Company, 15 Minn. 270 (Express Companies); Robinson v. Southeni 
Railroad Company, 40 App. Cas. (D. C.) 549, Ann. Cases, 1914 C 959 (Sleep-
ing Car Companies); C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Minneapolis Civic Associa-
tion, 247 U. S. 490 (June, 1918, involving separate charges over terminal 
tracks). 
C.OlltMON CARRitRS-DISCRIMINATION BY GRAN'l.'ING SPECIAL PRIVIL!GJ;S.-
Plaintiff bought a railway ticket to a station at which his train did not stop. 
He brought an action for damages caused by requiring him to change cars 
so as to take a train stopping at his station. Held, .that under such circum-
stances it was the duty of the passenger to stop off and wait for such train. 
Defendant company could not stop the other train at that station for plaintiff 
without violating the Federal Statute forbidding granting to any person any 
privileges in the transportation of persons or property, except such as are 
,specified in the tariff. May v. S. A. L. Ry. (S. C. 1918), g6 S. E. 482. 
The common law rule that charges must be reasonable did not require 
that they should be equal. Fitchburg Ry. Co. v. Gage, 12 Gray 393. If the 
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charge tc me is reasonable I cannot complain that the charge to you was less, 
was the doctrine of the old cases. In Schofield v. L. S. & M. S. Ry., 43 Ohio 
St. 571, the effect of this doctrine in building up the Standard Oil Company 
and in crushing its competitors, led the court severely to limit the doctrine. 
It was reviewed in Cook v. C. R. I. & 0. Ry., 81 Ia. 551, with the conclusion 
that carriers were not presumed to be in the business of "alms-giving''. The 
only reasonable conclusion is that the less rate was reasonable, and the greater 
was too much. Judge Landis in U. S. v. C. & A. R31., 148 Fed. 646, took 
the ground that "no rate can possibly be reasonable that is higher than any-
body else has to pay." Meantime statutes were taking the same direction and 
dealing with discriminating service as well as rates. They were not merely 
:fixing a maximum rate, but were providing that there should be but one 
rate and one set of privileges for all in the same class. The main object of 
the acts of 1906 and 19rn was held to be to secure equality of treatment 
for all. Adams E:rpress Co. v. Crominger, 226 U. S. 491. A newspaper ccii-
tor. must pay the same cash fare as other passengers, and cannot lawfully 
ride on a pass paid for by advertising. McNeil v. D. & C. Ry. Co., 132 N. C. 
5rn; C. J. & L. Ry. v. U. S., 219 U. S. 486. Equally forbidden is the issue 
of a free pass in settlement of a claim for damages against a railroad. L. & 
N. R. C'J. v. ftfattley_. 219 U. S. 467. Nor can a sheriff pay for his rides by 
his fees in snits in which the railroad was a party. In a recent case his 
removal from office was justified because he made such an arrangement. 
Coco v. Oden (La., 1918), 79 So. 287. An agreement to expedite a shipment 
is equally within the inhibition. C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155; 
Clegg v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 203 Fed. 971. See also previous notes, 13 
MICH. L. Rsv. 514, 14 M1cH. L. Rsv. 416. In a recent opinion, Mr. Justice 
Holmes thinks "the passion for equality sometimes leads to hollow formulas". 
In Postal-Tel. Cable Co. v. Tonopah & Tide Water R. Co. (U.S. Sup. Ct., 
Jan. 20, 1919), he :finds contracts for exchange services between telegraph 
and railroad companies, whether on or off the line, are not within the Act 
.of June 18, r9rn, c. 309, Sec. 7, thus reversing the ruling of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, and affirming, 241 Fed. 162, 249 Fed. 664 
CRIMIN.AI, LAw-CoNsTRuC'l'm !NTF;NT-INvor.uNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.-
Defendant sold to deceased "cream soda'' containing 38% wood alcohol, 
which deceased imbibed with fatal effect. The trial court charged, in effect, 
that if defendant, without knowledge of its poisonous quality, put wood 
alcohol in the soda with intent to make an intoxicating liquor to sell in viola-
tion of the laws of the state, he was guilty of manslaughter, and of this 
crime the jury found him guilty. Held, no error, the sale of intoxicating 
liquor being "not only malum in se, but malltm prohibit11m." State v. Keever, 
(N. Car., 1919), 97 S. E. 727. 
It is commonly held that, in order that intent to do one act may supply 
the criminal intent necessary for conviction of doing another and unintended 
act, it is essential that the act intended be wrongful in: itself, not merely pro-
hibited by law. In other words, although no question of moral culpability is 
involved where one intentionally does· a prohibited act (Reynolds v. U. S., 
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g8 U. S. r45; U.S. v. Harmo1~, 45 Fed. 414), where such act is done unin-
tentionally there must be moral culpability to constitute crime. Reg. v. 
Frankli1i, 15 Cox C. C. 163; Com. v. Adams, II4 Mass. 323; State v. Horton., 
139 N. C. 588; Estell v. State, 51 N. J. L. 182. The distinction must rest, 
on the one hand, on policy oppos~d to the admission in normal cases of the 
ethical issue, and, on the other hand, to repugnance for "constructive crime." 
The doctrine injects into the law a very broad question of ethics, upon which 
reasonable men an; bound to differ. The Supreme Court of Connecticut 
seems to have differed from that of North Carolina upon the moral aspects 
of the liquor traffic, for, although they held intent to sell liquor without a 
license supplied the necessary intent for conviction of selling adulterated li-
quor, they put it upon a repudiation of the malmn in se doctrine, at least 
where the act intended is criminal and not merely tortious. State v. Stanton, 
37 Conn. 421. Looking more closely at the principal case, it will be seen 
that it may be said to-rest, not upon the ground that the sale of liquor is im-
moral, but upon the narrower ground that the sale of liquor with knowledge 
that such sale is prohibited-that is to say, deliberate flouting of the law-·is 
immoral. It will also be apparent that conviction might haYe rested upon 
the principle of negligence, that one is bound to know what is a matter of 
common knowledge. As Justice Holmes said in a similar case, "Common e..""<-
perience is necessary to the man of ordinary prudence, and a man who as-
sumes to act as the defendant did must have it at his peril." Com. v. Pierce, 
138 Mass. 165. See also, White v. State, 84 Ala. 421; State v. Hardie, 47 
Ia. 647. 
DAMAGts-~n1st.>oS1'!'10N 'tO Disr:Ast-PRoXIMA'rS CA:usr:.-Plaintiff fell 
as result of the defendant's negligence. The evidence tended to show that 
prior to the accident the ,plaintiff was in apparently good health but had a 
latent tendency to ulcer of the stomach due to excessive acidity. After the 
injury an ulcer developed. Defend.ant asked for an instruction negativing a 
recovery since the injury merely caused an acceleration of the ulcer and 
there was no evidence to show how much it was accelerated. Held, that the 
instruction was properly refused. "Where, as here, the latent disease or 
weakness did not cause pain, suffering, etc. to the plaintiff but such condition 
plus the fall caused such pain, the fall and not the latent condition is the 
proximate cause and the plaintiff is entitled to recover the entire damage 
shown to haYe resulted from such fall." Hahn v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 
(N. ]., 1918), 105 Atl. 459. 
There is a remark in Dulieu v. White [1901], 2 K. B. 669, 679, which is 
very pertinent. In that case the defendant suffered a miscarriage as a resuit 
of the fright caused by the defendant's negligence. The court there said 
that it was immaterial that the defendant did not know her condition: "What 
does the fact matter? If a man is negligently run over or otherwise negli-
gently injured in his body it is no answer to the sufferer's claim for dam-
ages that he would have suffered less injury, or no injury at all, if he had 
not bad an unusually thin skull or an unusually weak heart." The sit11ation 
in the principal case is precisely the same. In Vosburg v. Put11e'!.', 8o \Vis. 
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523 the plaintiff's leg had to be amputated because of complications follow-
ing the defendant's touching the plaintiff's shin. The theory of the defence 
was predicated on the fact that the leg had previously been in a diseased 
condition. But the court held the defendant liable and approved of the rule 
that "the wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the 
wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him." 
See alse> McNamara v. Village of Cli11to11ville, 62 Wis. 207-predisposition 
to rheumatism making the illness more severe and prolonged; Baltimore City 
Passenger l?.y. Cn. v. Kemp, 6r Md. 74-predisposition to cancer. In the last 
case lhe court admitted that the predisposition was an intervening cause but 
this did not render the defendant any less liable because the "defendant must 
be supposed to know that it was the right of all classes of people, whether 
diseased or otherwise. to be carried in their cars, and it must be supposed 
that they knew that a personal injury inflicted upon anyone with predispo-
sition or tendency to cancer might, and probably would, develop the disease." 
To the same effect is Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Saxby, 213 Ill. 274. 68 L. R A. 
164; and cases cited in note 76 to Sec. 1244 of Su'.l'H£Rl.AND ON D~ACts (4th 
ed.). It is a related question whether such latent conditions will affect re-
covery under the WORKM£N's CoMP£NSATlON Acrs. There is less harmony 
among these latter cases. However, it would seem that the controlling prin-
ciples are the ~ame, as was pointed out in the note in 3 MINN. L. RF.V. 125. 
True enough, the causes are different, but it is difficult to see why they should 
operate differently merely because the cause in the one case is a negligent 
act and in the other it is the accident arising "out of and in the course of 
employment." Once the accident is brought within the statute the que~tion 
of cause is idelltical. Thus, recovery was allowed in Indianapolis Abbatoir 
·ca. v. Coleman, 117 N. E. 502; and Lloyd v. Sugg [1900), I Q. B. 481. See 
also the recent case of Wabash Ry. Co. v. bwustrial Com111issioti, l2I N. E. 
569- (Feb., 1919). But the contrary was hel<l in Stombaugh v. Pierlcss Wire 
Fence Co., 198 MK;h. 445. And compare Van Gorder v. Packard Mutorr:ar 
Co., 195 Mich. 588. 
EMlN£NT DoMAIN-COMP£NSATION-T1M£ oF V AJ.UATlON.-Petition in em-
inent domain proceedings to take part of plaintiff's land was filed hy defend-
ant in July, 1915. The trial to determine the land's value took place in Oc· 
tober, 1917. The property had greatly enhanced in value in the interim, and 
plaintiff claimed the increase. Held, one justice dissenting, the fixed rule 
in Illinois gave compens~tion as of the time of filing the petition, no matter 
what the value of the la,mj. became thereafter. City ()f Chicago v. Farwell 
(Ill., 1919), 121 N. E. 795. 
Owing to constitutional provision, the Uitiversal rule in eminent domain 
proceedings is that the property appropriated is to be paid for at its value 
at the time of the taking. Sweaney v. U.S., 62 Wis. 396; II L~WIS, EMIN!ONT-
DoM:AIN, (3rd Ed.), Sec. 70s. Where clear, tlie language- of the condemna-
tion statute in the particular jurisdiction is decisive as to. when the taking 
occurs. San Jose, etc. R. R. c~. v. Mayne, 8-3 Cal. 566; Laml>orn. v. Bell, 18° 
Colo. 346. The datt' Qf filing the petition is in several states accepted as the 
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time of the taking. Muncie Natural Gas Co. v. Allison, 3I Ind. App. 50. 
Others hold it to be the date of appraisement. Matter of FC1rs.vth Blvd., 
r27 Mo. 4r7. The dissenting opinion in the principal case contends for an 
exception to the general Illinois rule in those cases where years elapse be-
tween the time of filing the petition and the beginning of the trial, on the 
grounds that the nearer we get to paying the compensation with one hand, 
while applying the axe with the other, the nearer we come to justice to all 
the parties involved. See Parks v. City of Boston, 32 Mass. 198, 208. The 
reverse of the question showed itself in Sotith Park Commissioners v. Dun-
levy, 91 Ill. 49, where the property depreciated in value between the time of 
filing the petition and the time of the trial. The representatives of the public 
sought to change the rule of damages, bttt without success. 
EvmtNcE-CRIMINAL LAW-!:MPEACHMtNT oF Di:;FtNDANT-OTH:CR CRIM£S. 
-On cross-examination in a trial for murder the defendant, who had taken 
the stand in his own behalf, was asked whether he had held up another man 
and woman in another place of business at the point of a pistol and robbed 
them. The defendant's previous testimony was to the effect that he had 
come into the store to rob but not to kill; that he only fired at the deceased 
after the latter had attempted to kill him. The question was asked to im-
peach the defendant's credibility on this point. Held, that the evidence was 
competent since it tended to show that, instead of being a person who ·.vas 
seeking to avoid taking life, he was one who cared not whether, in the ac-
complishment of his purpose, he did or did not kill a human being. Stale v. 
Werner (La., 1919), 8o So. 596. 
A defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf submits himself to 
impeachment just as any other witness. Thottgh he can refuse to answer 
concerning other crimes by a claim of self-incrimination-Saylor v. Com.: 
monwealth, 97 Ky. 184-yet he is subject to the ordinary rules of evidence if 
he does not invoke that privilege. It is established that other crimes are not 
admissible in the trial of a particular issue although the exceptions to the 
rule have modified it to a considerable degree. But, whether the crimes are 
admissible to prove motive, identity, system or plan, it must still appear that 
they are connected with the present crime. State v. Hale, 156 Mo. 102; 
Bafo v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. 635; Rosensweig v. People, 63 Barb. (N. Y.), 634. 
If the exception laid down by the principal case were accepted it would mean 
that the exception would swallow the rule so that it would vanish altogether. 
The theory upon which the evidence is admitted in the principal case is that 
the statement of the defendant is inconsistent with actual existing fact-it 
is an inconsistent statement and hence admissible. But is not all impeaching 
testimony used to disclose a. state of facts contradicting the declaration of 
the witness? This would result in the admission of other crimes whether 
connected with the issue or not-so long as it could be used to impeach the 
credibility of the witness. To allow an exception, then, that other crimes 
can be used to impeach credibility amounts to making the exception the rule. 
But it seems that a few cases have erroneously recognized this broad excep-
tion. People v. Pete, 123 Cal. 373. See also Jackson·v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. 28r. 
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EvmENCE-'l'RANSAC'tIONS WITH DECEASED PERSONS.-The plaintiff, claim-
ing as assignee of a life insurance policy taken out by her late husband, was 
allowed to testify as to personal transactions between herself and the insured, 
for the purpose of proving the assignment. Held, that such evidence was 
proper. Ward v. New York Life Ins. Co. (N. Y., 1919), 122 N. E. 207. 
There is some conflict of authority on the question whether such evidence 
comes within the terms of statutes prohibiting such testimony in actions 
against decedent's estates. In Franken v. Order of Foresters, 152 Mich. 502, 
evidence of this nature was held incompetent, although the contest was 
between different beneficiaries and the estate of the insured would 
not in any event receive the money. This case was adversely criti-
cised in Savage v. Modern Woodmeµ, 84 Kan. 63, where the decisiQn was ex-
plained as the result of "excluding witnesses who are within the reason of 
the statutory rule, although not within its terms, while the general practice 
and the practice in this state is to the contrary." In a number of cases the 
rule has been laid down that beneficiaries named in insurance policies are 
not disqualified under the statute from testifying as to transactions with the 
deceased. Grand Lodge v. Dillard (Tex. Cr.) 162 S. W. 1173; Ericksoii v. 
Modern Woodmen, 43 Wash. 242; Sherret v. Royal Clan, 37 Ill. App. 446; 
Shuman v. Knights of Honor, 110 Ia. 48o; Hamill v. Royal Arca111mi, 152 
Pa. 537; Macaitlay v. National Bank, 27 S. C. 215. But the principal case, 
while relying on a number of the cases here cited, goes farther than any of 
them, since it deals with a case of assignment by the deceased to the plain-
tiff. The court is evidently in sympathy with Mr. Wigmore's severe criti-
cism of the policy of the statute. 1 W1GMoru; ON EVIDENCE, Sec. 578. 
HUSBAND AND
0 
WIFE-SUIT BY WIFE FOR CoN!;ORTIUM.-Plaintiff's husband 
was severely and permanently injured through the negligence of Defendant. 
Plaintiff sues to recover for the loss of her husband's companionship and 
support, occasioned by the injury. Held, (one justice dissenting) plaintiff 
could not recover, even though her common law disabilities had been removed 
by statute. Bernhardt v. Perry (Mo., 1918), 2o8 S. W. 462. 
For a discussion of this question as t~ whether the wife, emancipated by 
statute, is entitled to sue for the loss of consortium, see the notes in 14 M1cH. 
L. R.Ev. 689 and 12 M1cH. L. R.Ev. 72. 
JURY-How FAR THE CoURT MAY GO IN URGING AGREEMENT.-The jury 
went to the jury room to consider their verdict at 1 :30 p. m. The next. day 
at noon they reported a disagreement and asked to be discharged. The judge 
told them that the court could transact no business unless it could get ver-
dicts; that they were as good a jury as could be obtained·; that he appreciated 
their desire to get home, but the county which had stood the expense of the 
trial ought not to lose the benefit of it if an agreement was reasonably pos-
sible; that he would not force an agreement even if he could, but he thought 
a further consideration might bring them together; and he asked them to 
try again. This was substantially repeated at the close of the afternoon ses-
sion. The next afternoon they brought in a verdict. Held, the language of 
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the court was improper, inasmuch as it suggested an agreement as a means 
to save expense, thus "deprivit:tg them of that freedom which the law con-
templates they should exercise in reaching a verdict." The verdict was set 
aside. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Barber (Commission of Appeals of 
Te.xas, 1919), 209 S. W. 394-
This is a very extreme case. In Fleck v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. (Tex. 
Civ. App.), 191 S. W. 386, an almost identical reference to the e.""<:pense of the 
trial was held proper. In Kelly v. Emery, 75 Mich. 147, the court said to the 
jury: "This case has already been tried once, and the amount involved is 
not large, and the parties cannot afford to litigate it forever, and the county 
cannot afford to have them do it. You see it takes some time to try the 
case, and I hope you will be able to arrive at ~ ~onclu~ion and settle the 
facts in the case, at least." This was held to be entirely proper. In 1-Vatsoii 
v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 53 Minn. 551, it was held proper to urge the 
jury to inake every honest effort to agree because another trial would make 
expense to the county and to the parties. In Knickerbocker Ice Ca. v. Penn-
sylvania R. R. Co., 253 Pa. 54, it was held proper to urge the jury to agree 
in view of t\le length of time coµsum,ed in t,he trial and the amount of testi-
mpny ~eard. 
¥A~TI'..R A."\p S:ERvAN'£-fuLA'l'ION.-Plaintiff, an employee of defendant, 
after sev:~i;al days d,iscontinuance of his work because of an inji;red foot, 
rel;_tffn~d to h,is. place o~ employment, arriving there about 15 or 20 minutes 
be.fw~ h~ work ordinarily comq1enced. He did not at this time apply for 
his worlc cai;-d, noi- did he gq for his tools, but went into a small shack to 
warm, this shack being used for such purpose by the workmen with defend-
apl;'S; ~q.wledge and acquiescence. While here the stove fell, injuring plain-
tiff,_ "!t:t.<l ~his su_it i& brollf;ht to re~-0ver for such injury. Held, defendant 
at the tim,e <?.f ~ injury owed no duty to plaintiff with reference to the 
stovt)J the r~l~t.WI.J. of master and Sel"Vant not then exis.ting. Flaniga1~ v. 
K;. C., $.Ry., (~e., 1919), ~ S. W. 441. . 
No doubt can arise as. to the pi;opi;iety of this decision,. for though ~n 
so~c; C<\Ses th~ qu~tion wh~ther the relation of master ~nd, serva11t ~xisted 
i~ \eft to the jury, ~uch is not the rule when the evidence. is as conclusive 
as it is here. In the case of a workman who begins his labors a,t a certain hou1 
in the morning there is necessarily a time when he is on the premises of the 
ma~ter going to. his work, and prepar~g for his w0rk :;ts by washing his 
hands, procuring his tqols, or changing his clothes. "All these requirements 
are incident to the employme1.lt, and i~ is ~ei;efoi:e h,eld t~at the r~la~iqn of 
master and s.eryant continm:s from 9-. :i:eason~ble ti~ ~ef-0r-e th.e actual ~ 
ginning of w-or-k u~til a :reaso.nal>l~ tilt\e subseq11en.t th,ereto." Lyo1a v. Pe-0-
ple' s So:l!i.ngs. Ban.k, 251 Pa. s®,. In the English case o.f Sha.rp. v. 1cJlmso~~ 
& Co., [1905] 2 K. B. 13g, cited with approval in. the- pr-li.i.cipal case th,e cour-t 
held that the relation existed when ~n emplG_yee, ~ri;iving on hi.~ employ-ei:'s 
premises 20 minutes befol.'e he was: to beg:in work, wa!? inh1i;ed. it beipg show~ 
that it was custotna.ry· for the w.-0i;~me~ to arr-~veo as early a.s this, and upon 
·ari-iving to deposit their tkk;ets a..t: th~ office and go to tI:ie UleSs cabin for 
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refreshment. Where the plaintiff reached his employer's building 5 or IO 
minutes before his period of employment was to begin, and haying taken the 
elevator to get his working clothes was injured by the negligence of the ele-
vator operator whom he was to relieve, the court held that at the time of 
the injury the plaintiff was a servant of the defendant. Lyons v. Pcople'.r 
Bank, sz1pra. In an earlier case in the same court where a workman was 
injured b,Y the explosion of a boiler at his place of employment, which oc• 
curred ten to thirty minutes before the hour for commencing work, it being 
the habit to use the time between his arrival and starting work in oiling and 
getting ready his machine, it was held that the question whether he had ar-
rived at the works within a reasonable time was a question for the jury; and 
the jury having found that the relation of master and servant did exist at 
the time, their finding was sustained. Walbert v. Tre%ler, 156 Pa. St. n2. 
For ah annotation of cases involving the question whether the relation was 
existing, see 13 NEGJ.lGENCS AND CoMPENSATION CASES, ANNOTATED, 630. 
TAXATION-RIGHT OF STATE TO SEI.I. PROPERTY OF MUNlCIPAI.ITY FOR TAX-
ss.-The land in question had been assessed for taxes and the assessment roll 
had been confirmed by the city council twenty days before the city bought 
the land on which it erected an engine house for its fire department. The 
state and county taxes were ~returned delinquent to the auditor general. In 
the usual manner at the tax sale the state bid in the property and later the 
plaintiff got tax deeds to the land fr.om the state. All notices required by 
the statute were given by the plaintiff, but the city neither repaid the plaintiff 
nor demanded a reconveyance after tender. In a petition for a writ of as-
sistance to obtain possession of the land, it was held that the land was not 
exempted from taxes because subsequently put to a municipal purpose, ·and 
that tl1e city was in the position of any other negligent owner. (Brooke and 
Kuhn, JJ., dissenting.) PetiJion of Auditor General (Mich., 1918), 170 N. 
w. 549. 
In general if the municipality bought and applied the land to a use which 
exempted the lot from taxation before the lien for taxes against the land 
was perfected, then the liability .of the land to taxation was arrested and the 
lot could not be sold for taxes ; the theory being that none had legally accrued, 
Laurel\'. Weems (19n), 100 Miss. 335, Ann. Cas. 1914 A, 159; Territory of 
Arizona v. Perrin (1905), 9 Ariz. 316; Gachet v. New Orleans (1900), 52 La. 
Ann. 813, L. R. A. 1915 C 129. If a lien for taxes had attached before the 
municipality bought the land, the state then giving ..a tax deed for the de-
linquent taxes, the power of the state so to sell the land is questioned. Some 
cases, however, do not consider the question of the power of the state to sell, 
but say that if the lien once attaches, then purchase by the municipality does 
not exempt the land from taxes, Pubiic Schools &c. v. O'Con11or (1go6), 
143 Mich. 35; Pu;yallup v. Lakfo (1907), 45 Wash. 368. But in other cases 
the power of the state to give a valid tax title is questioned on the ground that 
the municipality having the title of the grantor, holds such title as agent of 
the state, and that there is a merger of the tax title of the state with this 
title which the municipality obtained, Graham v. Detroit (1913), 174 Mich. 
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538, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 836; Foster v. Dufath (1913), 120 Minn. 484, 48 L. R. 
A. (N. S.) 70'/· The instant case recognised this doctrine, but distingutshed 
Graham v. Detroit, supra, saying that the merger occurred only when the 
municipality acted as agent of the state, and that in the instant case there was 
no merger, -for the city was acting in regard to the fire department, a purely 
local matter, Davidson v. Hine (1go8), 151 Mich. 294, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 57.5. 
It would seem that the courts should hold that there is a merger of the twOI 
titles when it can be conceded that the municipality is acting as agent of the 
state. On the other hand when the municipility acts in a matter of local 
rather than general interest, it would seem that the courts would divide, even 
as they differ on the question of legislative control over municipalities in 
-matter ·of local concern to the latter. Michigan has upheld the doctrine of 
- home rule and the right of local self government for cities, People e:: rel 
Le Roy v. Hierlbut (1871), 24 Mich. 44; Davidson v. Hine, supra. On the re-
lated question of municipal liability for the tort of its fire department, other 
courts have held that there was no liability on the ground that the fire de-
partment is a matter of general concern rather than of local interest; Burrell 
v. City of Augusta (1886), 78 Me. n8; Smith v. City of Rochester (1879), 
76 N. Y. 506; Frederick v. City of Columbus (18g8), 58 Oh. St. 538. From 
a practical and judicial point of view, however, it is often difficult to deter-
inine whether a given case is of locaf or general concern. Distinctions on 
this basis are bound tq give trouble, for municipal acts usually have two as-
pects: when primarily governmental and public in their nature and purpose, 
still they are incidentally a benefit to the municipality, and the reverse is also 
true. 
WILI.S-.PATENT AMBIGUITY-DESIGNATION OF DEVISES. Paragraphs 2 to 7 
of testator's will were devoted to devises of lands; paragraphs 8 to 15, to be-
quests of personalty. ·Paragraph 16, devising certain real property to "my 
son John S. Bruce,'' ended iri the middle of a line, and paragraph 17, begin-
ning with a capital letter, gave the residue "to have and to hold to him his 
heirs, executors, administrators and assigns." Held, that the scheme of the 
will and the apparent independence of each preceding paragraph would not 
permit of construing paragraphs 16 and 17 together; that paragraph 17 there-
fore name no legatee and a patent ambiguity existed to remedy which parol 
evidence was inadmissible. Bruce v. Bmce, (N. J. Ch., 1918) 105 Atl. 492. 
The conclusions of the court are by no means free from difficulty. Con-
ceding that the two paragraphs in question were not related structurally, that 
fact would not necessarily preclude construing them as connected in meaning. 
In Kuehle v. Zimmer. 249 Ill. 544. paragraphs wholly independent both as to 
arrangement in the will and as to express subject matter, were read together 
because of an inference deduced from particular words used in one of them. 
The distinction invoked by the decision of the principal case between patent 
and latent ambiguities as a ground for the admission of extrinsic evidence in 
aid of the interpretation of wills is universally recognized. But the applica-
tion of the' rule has more than once taxed the ingenuity as well as the wisdom 
of the legal profession. In Hunt v. Hort, 3 Bro. C. C. 3n, it was held that a 
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bequest to "Lady " was not to be supplemented by parol and Ba31lis 
v. Attonze:.v Gener.-il, 2 Atk:. 239, is to the same effect. Such an expression in 
a will would seem the equivalent of a complete blank as denoting that the 
testator had not yet decided upon the legatee. Yet the court allowed affidavits 
to help expain which of three granddaughters the testator intended should 
take under devise to "my granddaughter ." Goods of Hubb11ck, 
92 L. T. N. S. 665. 
If, in the principal case, the word "him" may be construed as a blank space 
(see cases supra) or as if description had been omitted by mistake or inad-
vertence (Engeltlzaler v. Engeltlzaler, 1g6 Ill. 230; Karsten v. Karsten, 254 Ill. 
480; Haw111aii v. Thomas, 44 Md. 30; Davis v. Davis, 8 Mo. 56; Crooks v. 
Wliitford, 47 Mich. 283; 1 JARMAN, Wrr,LS, [3rd Am. Ed.] c. 14, p. 350) the 
holding is undoubtedly supported by the weight of authority. But the right 
so to disregard a personal pronoun is seriously challenged by the opinion fa 
Eichorn v. M orat, 175 Ky. So, 193 S. W. 1013. In that case the testatrix made 
a will of one paragraph which contained no other designation of the benefic-
iary than was supplied by the term "he." The court advanced, in part, the 
following interpretation to justify the admission of extrinsic evidence: "In 
the instant case it would be wholly incompetent to show by extrinsic proof 
that the testatrix meant by the use of the personal pronoun "he" a female 
to whom the word used did not apply*** It (to ascertain by extrinsic proof 
the person here referred to) does no violence to the rule against the sub-
stitution .of a devisee when none is mentioned.*** It is true that in the case 
we now have the pronoun "he" which the testatrix employed might be ap-
plied to a great many persons, but when it is remembered that**** the same 
might be said with ~reference to the name "John"*** we are unable to dis-
tinguish and logical reason why the rule should not be applied in the one 
case as well at the other*** The two cases exhibit a difference in degree 
only, and not in kind." 
WORK AND LABOR-CONTRACT TO PAY BY L1'GACY-RIGHTS OF LEGATEE. p 
worked as a servant for D'~ testator under an eXpress agreement that her 
services would be compensated by a legacy. P declined to accept the legacy 
provided by the testator and sued for the reasonable value of her services. 
Held, P could recover. Shemetzer v. Broegler, (N. J. 1918) 105 Atl. 450. 
Recovery was allowed under similar circumstances in Reynolds v. Robinson, 
64 N. Y. 589, the court holding that plaintiff could accept the legacy and also 
maintain suit for the difference between the legacy and the reasonable value 
of the services. But in Lee's Appeal, 53 Conn. 363, it was held that any legacy, 
however small, complied with the terms of the contract and precluded re-
covery on the basis of a quantum meriiit. The New York case and the instant 
case in effect enunciate the same rule, which may be called the rule of reason-
able construction. The Connecticut case enunciates the rule of strict construc-
tion; it enforces the contract exactly as made by the parties and refuses to 
read into the contract any terms not incorporated therein by the parties. The 
courts would have avoided much difficulty in application if the doctrine of 
strict construction had been consistently maintained. The New York court 
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has in other types of cases shown marked liberality in reading into an other-
wise absolute contractual provision the word 'reasonable' or its equivalent; for 
example, in the builders' contract cases where an architect's certificate is 
stipulated for it has been held that the production of such certificate is ex-
cused when it is disclosed that the architect has refused unreasonably or ca-
priciously. Bowery National Bank v. The Mayor, etc. of New York, 63 
N. Y. 336; Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648. This doctrine has been generally 
followed. Batchelor v. Kirkbride 26 Fed 899; Michaelis v. Wolf, 1.36 Ill. 6&; 
Chism v. Schipper, 51 N. J. L. 1. New York has also shown liberality where 
an action is brought on an insurance policy which provided for a certificate of 
a specific person as a condition precedent t-0 the recovery of a loss under the 
1J0'1icy, Lang v. Eagle Fire Co., 12 App. Div. 39, where the certificate of the 
notary living nearest the place of fire was required, and it was held that on 
·his refusal to act it was sufficient if the insured furnished to the insurer a 
certificate of the nearest notary who consents to act. This decision, however, 
is out ·of accord with the great weight of authority. W orslry v. Wood, ·6 T. R. 
710; Johnson v. Phoenix Insur. Ca., 112 Mass. 49; Colitmbia fos11r. Co. v. 
Lawrence, 35 U. S. 10; Protection Insur. Co. v. Pherson, 5 Ind. 417; Lead-
better v. Etna Insur. Co., 13 Me. 265. In view of the fact that it is the duty 
of courts to enforce the contracts as made by the parties and not to make or 
change their contracts, the ·strict rule of Lee's Appeal, supra, seems preferable 
to that of the instant case. 
